Material and Discursive Militarisation in Democracies

Recent years have seen the expansion of the military's visibility and social role in many democracies. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic- democracies across the world had been deploying their militaries in an expanding range of operations. This has raised concerns about a return of the military as a political actor and the militarisation of democratic politics. Worries about the military becoming the "gravedigger of democracy" have resurfaced once again in recent years. Military coups in Africa, the expansion of military roles in law enforcement in Latin America, and an intensification of geostrategic conflicts in Asia have raised concerns about the militarisation of politics and its dangers for democratic processes, political rights, and civil liberties. However, across the world's democracies, there are few signs of a coherent trend towards the "material" militarisation of politics. Military coups and other forms of undue military influence on government formation are the exception in democratic countries, and the relative resource endowment of the military has actually declined over the last three decades. Nonetheless, there has been a worrying trend of democracies deploying their militaries for an increasing range of non-traditional missions in response to external or domestic security threats, including anti-terrorism activities, crime fighting, and the maintenance of law and order. To legitimate these non-traditional missions, democratic governments have engaged in a militarisation of the security discourse which portrays the use of military force as justified and "normal." Over the medium to long term, these militarised discourses may lead to material militarisation and the erosion of civilian control and democratic quality. Democracies deploy their militaries in a range of operations, which are often accompanied by a militarised security discourse to legitimise the use of military force as a socially acceptable or "normal" tool of civilian politics. Over time, these militarised discourses may lead to material militarisation and the erosion of civilian control and democratic quality. External actors should, therefore, focus not only on reining in military coups and other forms of undue military influence on democratic politics, but also support the demilitarisation of security discourses in recipient countries

Materielle und diskursive Militarisierung in Demokratien

Weltweit hat das Militär in vielen Demokratien in letzter Zeit eine Aufwertung seiner Rolle und Sichtbarkeit erfahren. Nicht erst seit der Covid-19-Pandemie setzen demokratisch verfasste Staaten ihre Streitkräfte in einem immer breiteren Spektrum von Aufgaben ein. Dies hat zum Teil Besorgnis über eine Rückkehr des Militärs als politischer Akteur und die Militarisierung demokratischer Politik ausgelöst. Militärputsche in Afrika, die Ausweitung der Rolle des Militärs in der inneren Sicherheit in Lateinamerika und eine Verschärfung geostrategischer Konflikte in Asien geben Anlass zur Sorge über die Militarisierung der Politik und die damit verbundenen Gefahren für demokratische Prozesse, politische Rechte und bürgerliche Freiheiten. In den Demokratien der Welt gibt es jedoch nur wenige Anzeichen für einen einheitlichen Trend zu einer "materiellen" Militarisierung der Politik. Militärputsche sind in Demokratien ebenso die Ausnahme wie unzulässige militärische Einflussnahme auf die Regierungsbildung und die relative Ressourcenausstattung des Militärs hat in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten eher ab- als zugenommen. Allerdings setzen Demokratien ihre Streitkräfte für ein immer breiteres Spektrum Aufgaben zur Bedrohungsabwehr im Innern und nach außen ein, etwa in der Terrorismus- und Verbrechensbekämpfung und der Aufrechterhaltung von Recht und Ordnung. Um diese Missionen zu legitimieren, betreiben demokratische Regierungen oft eine Militarisierung des Sicherheitsdiskurses, die die Anwendung militärischer Gewalt rechtfertigt. Mittel- bis langfristig kann sich diese diskursive Militarisierung in eine materielle Form übersetzen und zur Erosion der zivilen Kontrolle und der demokratischen Qualität führen. Demokratien nutzen ihre Streitkräfte für eine Vielzahl von Aufgaben. Allerdings wird der Einsatz des Militärs oft von einem militarisierten Sicherheitsdiskurs begleitet. Diese Diskurse können die materielle Militarisierung, die Erosion der zivilen Kontrolle und der demokratischen Qualität befördern. Externe Akteure sollten daher nicht nur Militärputsche und militärische Einflussnahme auf die demokatische Politik verurteilen, sondern auch die Entmilitarisierung des Sicherheitsdiskurses in den Empfängerländern unterstützen

Measurement of the Dipion Mass Spectrum in X(3872) -> J/Psi Pi+ Pi- Decays

We measure the dipion mass spectrum in X(3872)--> J/Psi Pi+ Pi- decays using 360 pb-1 of pbar-p collisions at 1.96 TeV collected with the CDF II detector. The spectrum is fit with predictions for odd C-parity (3S1, 1P1, and 3DJ) charmonia decaying to J/Psi Pi+ Pi-, as well as even C-parity states in which the pions are from Rho0 decay. The latter case also encompasses exotic interpretations, such as a D0-D*0Bar molecule. Only the 3S1 and J/Psi Rho hypotheses are compatible with our data. Since 3S1 is untenable on other grounds, decay via J/Psi Rho is favored, which implies C=+1 for the X(3872). Models for different J/Psi-Rho angular momenta L are considered. Flexibility in the models, especially the introduction of Rho-Omega interference, enable good descriptions of our data for both L=0 and 1.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figures -- Submitted to Phys. Rev. Let

Search for Higgs Boson Decaying to b-bbar and Produced in Association with W Bosons in p-pbar Collisions at sqrt{s}=1.96 TeV

We present a search for Higgs bosons decaying into b-bbar and produced in association with W bosons in p-pbar collisions at sqrt{s}=1.96 TeV. This search uses 320 pb-1 of the dataset accumulated by the upgraded Collider Detector at Fermilab. Events are selected that have a high-transverse momentum electron or muon, missing transverse energy, and two jets, one of which is consistent with a hadronization of a b quark. Both the number of events and the dijet mass distribution are consistent with standard model background expectations, and we set 95% confidence level upper limits on the production cross section times branching ratio for the Higgs boson or any new particle with similar decay kinematics. These upper limits range from 10 pb for mH=110 GeV/c2 to 3 pb for mH=150 GeV/c2.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures; updated title to published versio

Search for Pair Production of Scalar Top Quarks Decaying to a tau Lepton and a b Quark in ppbar Collisions at sqrt{s}=1.96 TeV

We search for pair production of supersymmetric top quarks (~t_1), followed by R-parity violating decay ~t_1 -> tau b with a branching ratio beta, using 322 pb^-1 of ppbar collisions at sqrt{s}=1.96 TeV collected by the CDF II detector at Fermilab. Two candidate events pass our final selection criteria, consistent with the standard model expectation. We set upper limits on the cross section sigma(~t_1 ~tbar_1)*beta^2 as a function of the stop mass m(~t_1). Assuming beta=1, we set a 95% confidence level limit m(~t_1)>153 GeV/c^2. The limits are also applicable to the case of a third generation scalar leptoquark (LQ_3) decaying LQ_3 -> tau b.Comment: 7 pages, 2 eps figure

Search for Second-Generation Scalar Leptoquarks in ppˉ\bm{p \bar{p}} Collisions at s\sqrt{s}=1.96 TeV

Results on a search for pair production of second generation scalar leptoquark in $p \bar{p}$ collisions at $\sqrt{s}$=1.96 TeV are reported. The data analyzed were collected by the CDF detector during the 2002-2003 Tevatron Run II and correspond to an integrated luminosity of 198 pb$^{-1}$. Leptoquarks (LQ) are sought through their decay into (charged) leptons and quarks, with final state signatures represented by two muons and jets and one muon, large transverse missing energy and jets. We observe no evidence for $LQ$ production and derive 95% C.L. upper limits on the $LQ$ production cross sections as well as lower limits on their mass as a function of $\beta$, where $\beta$ is the branching fraction for $LQ \to \mu q$.Comment: 9 pages (3 author list) 5 figure

Observation of Bs-Bsbar Oscillations

We report the observation of Bs-Bsbar oscillations from a time-dependent measurement of the Bs-Bsbar oscillation frequency Delta ms. Using a data sample of 1 fb^-1 of p-pbar collisions at sqrt{s}=1.96 TeV collected with the CDF II detector at the Fermilab Tevatron, we find signals of 5600 fully reconstructed hadronic Bs decays, 3100 partially reconstructed hadronic Bs decays, and 61500 partially reconstructed semileptonic Bs decays. We measure the probability as a function of proper decay time that the Bs decays with the same, or opposite, flavor as the flavor at production, and we find a signal for Bs-Bsbar oscillations. The probability that random fluctuations could produce a comparable signal is 8 X 10^-8, which exceeds 5 sigma significance. We measure Delta ms = 17.77 +- 0.10 (stat) +- 0.07 (syst) ps^-1 and extract |Vtd/Vts| = 0.2060 +- 0.0007 (exp) + 0.0081 - 0.0060 (theor).Comment: 9 pages, 5 figures, submitted to Physical Review Letter

Search for anomalous semileptonic decay of heavy flavor hadrons produced in association with a W boson at CDF II

We present a search for anomalous semileptonic decays of heavy flavor hadrons produced in association with a $W$ boson, in proton-antiproton collisions at sqrt{s}=1.96 TeV. We use 162 pb-1 of data collected with the CDF II detector at the Fermilab Tevatron Collider. We select events with one W boson and at least one jet with an identified secondary vertex. In the jets with a secondary vertex we look for a semileptonic decay to a muon. We compare the number of jets with both a secondary vertex and a semileptonic decay, and the kinematic properties of these jets, with the standard model expectation of W plus heavy flavor production and decay. No discrepancy is seen between the observation and the expectation, and we set limits on the production cross section of a B-like hadron with an anomalously high semileptonic branching ratio.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures, submitted to PRD-RC; replaced to adjust the page forma

Measurement of the Ratios of Branching Fractions B(Bs->Ds- pi+)/B(B0->D-pi+) and B(B+->D0bar pi+)/B(B0->D-pi+)

We report an observation of the decay Bs -> Ds- pi+ in p pbar collisions at sqrt(s) = 1.96 TeV using 115 pb^(-1) of data collected by the CDF II detector at the Fermilab Tevatron. We observe 83 +/- 11 Bs -> Ds- pi+ candidates, representing a large increase in statistics over previous measurements and the first observation of this decay at a p pbar collider. We present the first measurement of the relative branching fraction B(Bs -> Ds- pi+) / B(B0 -> D- pi+) = 1.32 +/- 0.18 (stat.) +/- 0.38 (syst.). We also measure B(B+ -> D0bar pi+) / B(B0 -> D- pi+) = 1.97 +/- 0.10(stat.) +/- 0.21(syst.), which is consistent with previous measurements